Grindle reports from western Iraq, news

mauro — Tue, 13 Nov 2007 11:38:24 -0600

WCCA member and friend Doug Gindle sent in this most recent report from western Iraq: Al Asad airbase, western Iraq - As you know, Anbar Province in western Iraq is now pretty quiet. It used to be about the worst of the worst, and the bastion of the Sunni insurgency. Now there is about one tenth as much violence as before. It is pretty close to the 'acceptable level of violence' that is the goal here. It has happened because the Sunnis have allied themselves with the Iraqi government and US military, and booted out al Qaeda. But how did it happen? How did the Sunnis decide to fight against al Qaeda and throw in their lot with their sworn enemies? This question is important. Very important. It is the final score card on how to fight these kinds of wars, how the US did here, and what to do next. There are two very different answers as to what happened and why. One is right, one is wrong. I don't know which is which, but here are the versions and the evidence. Scenario 1 - The Marines (who run Anbar) did such a great job the enemy just gave up. The combination of ferocious attacks coupled with civil affairs projects (building schools, wells, roads etc) convinced the local Sunni sheikhs, who make the decisions, that the game wasn't worth the candle. Why endure the hurt when the US Marines and subordinate units instead will offer economic benefits and then go home? So they joined the US and Iraqi government and went against al Qaeda. This scenario portrays the Marines as increasingly in control. Scenario 2 - The locals got sick of al Qaeda and unilaterally decided to get rid of them. They fought al Qaeda and then allied themselves with the Iraqi government and the US military, which were seen as the lesser evil. The sheikhs realized the US would eventually leave. In this version, al Qaeda essentially controlled the province for years, but their tyranny became too onerous. Cutting hands off for stealing, summary executions for trivial offenses, killing popular local sheikhs for petty transgressions, forcing marriages between the daughters of local sheikhs and al Qaeda cadres. It was unbearable and so the Sunnis rose up. The evidence is this: - The Marines spent some money but not a huge amount on local aid projects. I don’t think I saw one in 2 years of being in Anbar. There were a good number, but there just seemed to be less than in other areas. - The local Sunni sheikhs told US Army soldiers that last November (2006) they got sick of al Qaeda and started to fight them. The extremists were too out of step with mainstream Iraqi culture, which is actually quite permissive. The Sunnis fought al Qaeda from November until January, when the US military noticed what was going on. By March the US military was cooperating with the Sunni 'rebels', even on operations. By June it was over and the Sunni sheikhs won, al Qaeda lost. - The conventional wisdom was that Anbar was a province that could be held but never converted. It would just eventually go along with developments in other parts of Iraq. The 'win' would be gradual. But in fact, within six months the change was 180 degrees, and the war was mostly won here. The flip was relatively quick - and not a gradually increasing ascendancy over the area predicted by the US military's own estimates. So that's the evidence. And those are the theories. This all matters because the Marines now want to 'take over' the war in Afghanistan, using their 'highly effective' methods developed in Anbar. That’s a good idea if you believe the Marines won in Anbar - after all, they won because they know how to fight counterinsurgencies. It is a lousy idea is you believe the other scenario - that al Qaeda was not only in control, but in such authoritative control that the local Sunnis were forced to take matters into their own hands. And the Marine methods created essentially no victory in the war. Al Qaeda did that all by themselves. Personally I think the Marines ought to stay out of Afghanistan.

Government Issue

Grindle sends a new report from Afganistan

mauro — Tue, 9 Oct 2007 13:02:19 -0500

Thanks to WCCA TV producer and supporter Doug Grindle for the update. We wish him well. He writes the following ( I XXed out the name of the exact district he discusses): Hello All: Things in eastern Afghanistan are fine. Starting to get a little cold up here at 7600 feet. Brr. But not too bad. 45 at night. I am here for a bit more then back to Kabul etc. Here is the latest NewsNote. Police again, more explanation and description. Attached as well for your viewing pleasure. CSPAN is airing this weekend at some point the 4th program from Iraq this trip. Never fear it is only 20 minutes long - if you can find it. Unfortunately I have no idea when it will be showing. I hope all's well. Just send an unsubscribe if you so desire. All the best Doug ////////// Khost Province, Afghanistan - There is a vicious chicken and egg cycle at work in Afghanistan, just now being reversed. Too few resources are allocated to police. Low pay makes it tough to recruit police. So there are too few policemen to do the job. So the job does not get done. So the people dislike the police and recruiting drops off even more. And so it goes on and on. Would you risk your life for $60 or so a month? That's what a policeman has been paid for the past six years. Would you risk your life as a policeman when you know the Afghan National Army foot soldiers are getting $120 a month or more for doing a similar job? Would you risk your life as policeman when instead you can make $110 a month cutting wood in the mountains? No, you wouldn't. Neither do the Afghans. American soldiers here say the police are undermanned. They cannot attract enough recruits. But finally, at last, there is pay reform and things are starting to change and wages boosted. When reconstruction kicked off six years ago the coalition divided up the responsibilities. The Americans took over training the Army, the Germans the police, and so on. The international community in its infinite wisdom decided that $50-60 a month is a living wage for an Afghan policeman. They were wrong. It's not. It’s taken the coalition six years to realize their mistake and in the next month or two pay is going to be boosted to the same level as the Afghan National Army soldiers. Way too late. The police now have an image problem. They are seen as corrupt and ineffective by the populace. For years they have been reduced to taking bribes from gem smugglers, taking illegal 'tolls' from passing trucks, and often taking hand-outs from insurgents. And they don't attract recruits either. One morning in the XXXX district, American advisors stop in at a district headquarters. Except there is no headquarters here. The old police station has been knocked down to make way for a district center that is half built. The new police station will probably, maybe, be built next year. Meanwhile the police and district sub-governor are squatting in the schoolhouse. Lord knows how they will all cope when the school year starts and the snows come in a few weeks The American advisors are here to meet with the police chief and sub-governor to check in on progress. There is little progress to report. The police have only 8 policemen on duty here. There are a reported 500-to-5000 (yes 5-thousand) insurgents in the hills nearby. Pakistan is only 6 miles away. XXXXX is a major infiltration route into the country for the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other insurgents. The police want to do what's right, but are powerless. They lack even enough gas for their brand-new Ford Ranger pickup trucks. And the police are important. Properly employed, they are the eyes and ears of the other security forces. The next time the conventional wisdom expresses concern that the war in Afghanistan is dragging on, consider the case of XXXXX district. And thank the international community for setting up the Afghan National Police to fail thoughout Afghanistan, through low wages and a sad lack of resources. And thank the Americans for allowing it to happen without ever rocking the boat.

Government Issue

Government Issue

Grindle reports from western Iraq, news

Grindle sends a new report from Afganistan